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Abstract 
Background. There are 32 teaching hospitals in France, including 30 University hospitals and 2 Regional teaching 
hospitals. Teaching hospitals have three roles: health care provision, training of healthcare professionals, and medical 
research. These roles lead to frequent interactions with pharmaceutical and medical device companies, inevitably raising 
major risks of conflicts of interests. Therefore, policies to manage conflict of interests (COI) are crucial. This study aims 
to examine COI policies in French teaching hospitals. 
.   
Methods. All French teaching hospitals (n=32) were included in this study. All hospitals websites were screened for 
institutional COI policies and curriculum on COI, using standardized keyword searches. More data were collected through 
a questionnaire addressed to each chief executive officer (CEO) of the teaching hospital. We used predefined criteria (n= 
20) inspired by similar surveys on COI policies in French, US and Canadian medical schools, with some additions to 
reflect the local hospital context. A global score for each hospital, ranging from 0 to 58 (higher scores denoting stronger 
policies) was calculated by summing points obtained for each criterion. 
 
Results. Three out of 32 (9%) CEOs replied to the questionnaire. All 32 hospitals had websites; 16 hospitals listed poli-
cies or regulations on their websites or provided them on request.  In December 2017, among the 32 hospitals, we found 
that 17 (53.1%) had rules and regulations for some items only, 4 (12.5%) have considered implementing a policy, two of 
which (6.3%) have begun implementation. and 15 (46.9%) had no evidence of COI policies and a null score. The maxi-
mum global score was 24 out of 58, with a mean of 3.50 ± 5.72. 
 
Conclusion. This is the first systematic assessment of COI policies in teaching hospitals in France. Such policies are 
needed to protect patients, clinicians and students from undue commercial influence. Despite public and political pressure 
for better management of COI since France’s benfluorex (Mediator) scandal of 2010, few teaching hospitals have 
implemented comprehensive and protective policies. We hope that periodic ranking of hospitals will contribute to raise 
awareness of the importance of COI policy and speed introduction. 
 
Background 
The rise of evidence-based medicine has been accompanied by increasing attention to commercial influences and conflicts 
of interests. The more evidence there is to demonstrate the biases that could affect many aspects of medicine, the more it 
appears that these influences pose a risk to the health of patients. 
In France, there are 32 teaching hospitals, which play a threefold role in training of nurses and physicians, medical 
research and medical care [1]. As key players in each of these functions, they interact extensively with healthcare 
industries.  These interactions are extensive and varied, both at institutional and individual levels. 
Teaching hospitals represent 37.9% of the country's public hospitals activity [1]. In their role as healthcare centers, 
hospitals are targeted in the promotion of health products. Hospitals are recognized to be at the peak of the prescription 
pyramid, with physicians in private practice tending to maintain patients on treatments initiated in hospital. The leverage 
effect of hospital prescriptions is therefore very important, especially for teaching hospitals that train future prescribers  
[2] : one hospital prescription may induce multiple prescriptions downstream. This effect, known as ‘the hospital to retail 
spillover’, has been analyzed and exploited by healthcare companies marketing and sales departments. [3, 4, 5, 6] In 
addition, a growing number of specialty products, generally amongst the most expensive, are reserved for hospital 
prescriptions. 
Commercial promotion takes the well-known form of one-to-one sales representative visits, but also invitations 
(conferences, meals), sponsored education, support for publications and speaking engagements for opinion leaders, or 
even promotional events within the hospital premises [6-17]. According to the French national transparency database [18], 
77.5% of physicians at teaching hospitals received at least one payment or gift (including in kind) over the period 2012-
2016. In 2014, 84% of doctors registered with the National College of Physicians received payments or gifts declared in 
the database [19]. Medical faculty members are particularly sought-after by industry as key opinion leaders (KOL) who 
have a strong influence on the practices and representations of their present and future colleagues, and easy access to the 
media. [20-24]  
At the institutional level, how hospitals are financed, especially research activities, introduces a conflict of interests. A 
growing proportion of teaching hospitals’ budgets, known as MERRI credits (Missions d’enseignement, de recherche, de 
référence et d’innovation -teaching, research, reference and innovation missions), is linked to criteria such as citation 
indices for publications, or the number of patients included in clinical trials [1]. At the same time, private companies are 
encouraged to outsource their research to public laboratories through an enhanced research tax credit. In this way, 
governments intend to align public research with private sector priorities in the hope of more immediate economic return. 
The creation of university or hospital foundations also makes it possible for the teaching hospital to be financed by 
healthcare firms, or even to create laboratories or teaching chairs benefiting from industrial sponsorship [1]. 
The legislation intended to prevent these many forms of influence within the teaching hospitals is the addition of measures 
taken over the course of decades. They tend to lack both comprehensiveness and specificity.  
All French teaching hospitals are public institutions and the professionals who work there are civil servants. They are 
therefore subject to series of procedures and obligations aimed at ensuring integrity, neutrality and good governance of the 
public service by preventing conflicts of interests. The existing provisions, derived from the Code of Ethics for the Public 
Administration [25], cover, in particular, holding multiple jobs (be it in the public or private sector), and the law on public 
procurement. However, these legal provisions suffer from numerous shortcomings and exceptions. 
The first French laws specific to health, known as “anti-gift laws”, were adopted a quarter of century ago (DMOS law of 
27/01/1993). They have been progressively strengthened [26, 27], in particular to increase the transparency of links of 
interests between health professionals and healthcare institutions and economic players in the sector. These obligations 
were extended in particular after the benfluorex (Mediator©) health scandal [28], which led, among other things, to the 
creation of a transparency register of interests inspired by the American Sunshine Act [18]. 
The Sales Visit Charter, a framework agreement between the Economic Committee for Health Products (CEPS), a 
governmental body, and the national association of the pharmaceutical industry (LEEM), sets out a set of rules for practice 
in the promotion of medicines to health professionals by pharmaceutical sales-representatives, agreed upon by all LEEM 
member companies [29].   
In their role as centers of higher medical education, each teaching hospital is linked to a faculty of medicine through a 
contractual agreement. Policies for the prevention and management of conflicts of interests in French medical schools 
were the subject of a previous study [30], which evaluated their scope and content, in line with initiatives previously 
carried out in the USA, Canada and Australia [31, 32, 33]. Following this study, the deans' conference adopted a voluntary 
Charter in 2017, which provides for cooperation with the CHUs in its implementation [34]. 
Finally, each teaching hospital has its own internal procedural rules, validated by the hospital Medical Commission, which 
can include more stringent measures to prevent conflicts of interests. 
Contrary to the British National Health Service (NHS) [35], there is no comprehensive and uniform policy on conflicts of 
interests applicable to French university hospitals. Therefore, we carried out this study in order to identify and evaluate 
existing conflicts of interests policies in the 32 teaching hospitals in France.   
Methods 
Scoring criteria for conflict of interest policies 
This study is based on the criteria used in the AMSA Scorecard and by Shnier and al. [36, 32], and used in a previous 
study on COI policies in French medical schools [30]. These criteria were adapted to the hospital context in an AMSA 
study of 200 US teaching hospitals [37]. A working group of FORMINDEP, a French organisation that supports 
independent medical education, further adapted this scoring system to the French context, finalising the set of criteria used 
in this study.  
The criteria take into account the specific activities of healthcare companies in teaching hospitals. In these criteria, 
"company" means any company involved in the field of health care, including medical devices and pharmaceuticals. We 
defined COI policies as any written, enforceable rule that is binding on all health professionals employed by the hospital.  
In France, pharmaceutical companies may provide educational support to medical residents to assist them with publication 
of scientific articles. This can play an important role in a doctor's career. Moreover, continuing medical education (CME) 
may be hosted and organized by teaching hospitals. We therefore decided to include criteria to address both this publica-
tion assistance and continuing medical education (criterion 5) and, more broadly, all corporate support to physicians' ca-
reers (criteria 1, 3, 4, 5, 6).  
 
Companies finance a large proportion of medical research and often have significant influence over the publication of 
results; we have included criteria for transparency of research and its funding (criteria 11,12).  
 
The presence of company representatives within hospital departments is a key factor in the influence of firms and must be 
covered by agreements with the hospital (criteria 2, 8, 9).  
 
Lastly, similarly to the approach taken by the AMSA Scorecard and Shnier et al., we also considered whether there were 
procedures in place for education, monitoring and enforcement (criteria 10, 13, 15, 16 17, 18, 19, 20). 
 
We retained 20 criteria, which are listed in box 1.  Nineteen of which are rated from 0 to 3:  
• 0: the hospital has no policy for this criterion, or it is not accessible.  
• 1: The hospital has an explicit policy, communicated to staff, but no additional information is available on 
regulatory and legal obligations for this criterion 1  
• 2: the hospital policy is limited in scope, or monitoring is insufficient.  
• 3: the hospital has an explicit policy on this issue at a high standard, reflecting standards in French law and 
contractual agreements between health authorities and health industry associations.   
One criterion (#10) is only rated 0 or 1 as it is binary in nature. A detailed explanation of rating criteria is provided in 
Appendix Table 2. 
Legal obligations refer to the following laws:  Laws 93-121 of 27/01/1993 ("Loi anti-cadeaux”, Anti-gifts Law), 2011-
2012 of 29/12/2011 (Bertrand Law), 2016-41 of 26/01/2016 ("Loi de modernisation du système de santé”, Health System 
Modernization Law), the Public Health Code and the Medical Code of Ethics. [27] 
Box 1: Rating criteria 
1- Management of gifts and benefits 
2- on site promotional presentations or speeches 
3- participation in promotional events funded by companies 
4- participation in medical conferences or internships funded by companies 
5- accredited continuing education 
6- ghostwriting 
7- advisory or speaking activities on behalf of companies 
8- access of representatives of pharmaceutical companies 
9- access of representatives of medical equipment, biology and imaging companies 
10- public disclosure of speaker’s interests 
11- research funding 
12- publication of clinical trials and transparency of research 
13- hospital service associations 
14- frameworks for market surveys 
15- procurement of medicines and medical devices 
16- conflict of interest education for teaching hospital staff  
17- extension of the rules to all actors linked to the teaching hospital 
18- governance rules 
19- monitoring the application of rules and sanctions 
20- authorities responsible for monitoring and reporting on conflicts of interest 
 
 
Data collection 
We used several methods to obtain information on conflict of interest policies at the 32 teaching hospitals. First, we 
searched the website of each teaching hospital in May 2017 and November 2017 to find policies related to COI or 
documents interpreting policies using the French terms : « conflits d'intérêts » (conflict of interests), « liens d'intérêts » 
(competing interests), “declaration publique d’intérêts” (public declaration of interest) , « industrie pharmaceutique » 
(pharmaceutical industry), « laboratoire pharmaceutique » (pharmaceutical firm), “éthique” or “deontologie” (ethics), 
“visiteurs médicaux”  or “visite médicale” (companies representatives)  , “financement” (funding), « charte » (charter), et 
« règlement intérieur » (internal rules). The name of each policy and the latest date of adoption or the date of the policy’s 
most recent review were recorded. 
Secondly, a registered letter was sent in May 2017 to each CEO of the 32 hospitals to inform them of the study. The letter 
explained its purpose, and the 20 criteria for which we required documentation. A second mail was sent in September 
2017 to the 30 non-responding university hospitals. A third letter sent to the communications department requested 
information on the hospital’s internal rules and regulations. 
At the same time, a letter was sent to the president of elected medical staff representatives of each hospital, to inform them 
about the study. 
The hospital CEOs were informed that we were only interested in publicly available policies and that while respondents’ 
names would be kept confidential, the teaching hospitals and their policies would be identified in any subsequent 
publication. We mentioned that the study has the support of ANEMF (Association Nationale des Etudiants en Médecine 
de France – National Association of the French Medical Students) and ISNAR-IMG (InterSyndicale Nationale Autonome 
Représentative des Internes de Médecine Générale - National Autonomous Union of General Practitioners Interns). 
Data collection continued until December 15, 2017. 
Two reviewers independently scored each teaching hospital’s policies. Any reviewer employed by a teaching hospital was 
barred from scoring their own institution. The research team met and collectively reviewed ratings to ensure consistency 
of application and interpretation of criteria across reviewers. Any discrepancy between the two reviewers was addressed 
by the team, with any reviewers employed by a teaching hospital excluded from assessment of their establishment. 
Similarly to Shnier and al. [32], we summed the scores of the twenty individual categories for each hospital to come up 
with a global score, with a range of 0 to 58.  
As no patients are involved in our study, and it relates to questions concerning policies at respondents’ institutions, rather 
than personal information, the Comité pour la Protection des Personnes (Comittee for human protection) Ile de France V, 
has written us that ethics approval was not required for our research. 
 
Results 
The 32 French teaching hospitals include 29 located in mainland France and 3 located in overseas territories. All of these 
university hospitals have a website. See Appendix table 3 for a list of the university hospitals and their website.  
In total, through mail, e-mail or screening of websites, we obtained information on 21 hospitals out of 32 (66%): Angers, 
Besançon, Bordeaux, Brest, Dijon, Lille, Limoges, Marseille, Montpellier, Nantes, Nîmes, Nice, Orléans, Paris (AP-HP), 
Poitiers, Reims, Rennes, Rouen, Saint-Etienne, Strasbourg, Toulouse. For the additional 11 hospitals for which no 
responses were obtained, we judged the hospital not to have a publicly-available COI policy as no indication of a COI 
policy was available via the hospital website.  
Mail and email survey 
Eight hospital CEOs (18.6%), responded to our survey or sent us information on their internal regulations. These 
regulations were sometimes also available on-line.  
The three mail responses to our inquiry of COI policy were from: Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), 
Toulouse, and Montpellier. 
Montpellier hospital is in the process of setting up a charter in order to improve their policies on conflicts of interests, 
focusing on 10 elements. Although potentially addressing part of our criteria, we could not include these in our overview, 
as no charter had been published or sent to us by the survey end date. 
Toulouse hospital has installed a conflict of interest committee as of March 2017. Its main role is to develop a conflict of 
interest policy and evaluate its implementation. The hospital is working on this in close collaboration with the medical 
faculty of Toulouse.  
The AP-HP provided us with publicly available reports about conflict of interests in their hospitals and detailed answers 
addressing our criteria. AP-HP set up a COI committee with the objective of assessing the status of conflict of interests 
within the institution and developing proposals for improvement. The commission submitted a report and proposals in 
May 2016, some of which have since been incorporated into internal regulations. 
We obtained by mail or e-mail response to our inquiry of the internal regulations from : Angers, Besançon, Rennes, 
Rouen, Strasbourg, Toulouse. At the deadline of the study, the internal regulations of Besançon and Strasbourg were under 
review. The internal regulations of Rennes and Rouen did not contain elements of a COI policy . Those of Angers 
contained elements of a COI policy. 
Internet screening 
We screened the websites of the 32 teaching hospitals, 10 (31.3%) of which had information on COI policies on their 
websites Appendix table 3 provides a list of the hospitals and information sources.  
University hospital scores 
In December 15 2017, only two hospitals have implemented a COI policy, and another two have initiated of policies that 
are not yet in place.  
We applied our 20-criteria scoring scale [range 0-58] to the 32 hospitals: 15 (46,9%) have a zero score, 13 (40,6%) a score 
of less than 10, 4 (12,5%) a score of 10 to 24. Toulouse hospital had the maximum score of 24. AP-HP (Paris) had a score 
of 20, AP-HM (Marseille) a score of 12, Montpellier a score of 11, Poitiers 9, Angers 8, , Nantes and Reims 6, Lille and 
Nîmes 4, Nice and Orléans 3, Rouen 2, and Besançon, Bordeaux and Dijon 1. The mean score was 3.50 ± 5.72. The 
median score was 1 (interquartile range 0 – 6) 
Table 1 : Overview of COI policy scores for each French teaching hospital (n = 17)*. 
 
Hospital Total 
score 
(range 
0-58) 
Score of 1 : policy exists, may not be 
active 
 
Score of 2 : limited scope Score of 3 : high standard 
Toulouse 24 [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[2] promotional presentations or 
speeches 
[4] medical conferences funded by 
companies  
[8] [9] access of representatives 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in 
hospital 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[13] hospital service associations 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical 
devices 
[16] COI education for teaching hospital staff 
[18] governance rules 
[19] monitoring the application of rules and 
sanctions 
[14] frameworks of market surveys 
[20] authorities responsible for 
monitoring  
APHP1 20 [2] promotional presentations 
[7] speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in 
hospital 
[19] monitoring the application of 
rules and sanctions 
[1] management of gifts and benefits 
[13] hospital service associations 
[[15] procurement of medicines or medical 
devices 
[18] governance rules 
 
[11], research funding 
[20] authorities responsible for 
monitoring 
APHM2 12 [19] monitoring the application of 
rules and sanctions] 
[1] management of gifts and benefits  
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in hospital  
[18] governance rules 
[15] procurement of medicines or 
medical devices 
 
Montpellier 11  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives  
[14] frameworks of market surveys 
 
Poitiers 9 [8] [9] access of representatives 
 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical 
devices  
[3] promotional events funded by 
companies 
Angers 8  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives 
 
Nantes 6 [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[1,11] 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical 
devices 
 
Reims 6 [2] promotional presentations or 
speeches 
[15] procurement of medicines or 
medical devices 
[1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
 
Lille 4 [7] advisory or speaking activities  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
Nîmes 4  [1] management of gifts and benefits  
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
 
Nice 3 [16] COI education for teaching 
hospital staff 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in 
  
                                                             
 
 
hospital  
[20] authorities responsible for 
monitoring  
Orléans 3 [7] advisory or speaking activities [1] management of gifts and benefits  
Rouen 2  [1] management of gifts and benefits  
Besançon 1 [1] management of gifts and benefits   
Brest 1 [11] research funding   
Dijon 1 [1] management of gifts and benefits   
Bordeaux 1 [7] advisory or speaking activities   
* An additional 15 French teaching hospital had no information on conflict of interest policies on their websites, and failed to reply to our request for information 
(See Appendix Table 2 for the list of all French teaching hospitals). 
 
 
 
The criteria with the highest scores were management of gifts and benefits, with two hospitals, Lille and Poitiers, having 
policies judged to be at a high standard, procurement of medicines and medical devices, one hospital, AP-HP, with a 
policy at a high standard, and monitoring and reporting of conflicts of interest (AP-HP, high standard). and eight hospitals 
policies that were limited in scope. Frameworks for market surveys were at a high standard in two hospitals, Montpellier 
and Toulouse.  Table 1 provides an overview of hospital scores.  
All hospitals scored zero on five criteria, indicating that these were no COI policies covering these activities: participation 
in promotional events funded by companies, accredited continuing education, ghostwriting, public disclosure of speakers’ 
financial interests, and clinical trial publication and research transparency. 
 
Discussion 
 
 
This is the first study of its kind in France. Our study highlights mixed results and, in general, limited attention to conflict 
of interest policies at French teaching hospitals. Of the 32 hospitals, only 4 have taken explicit steps towards developing 
and implementing COI policies. In two cases these policies are still under development. These policies are also incom-
plete, missing important activities that can lead to conflicts in teaching hospitals. On the other hand, more than half of 
hospitals (17 over 32) have elements of COI management policy, but the approach taken is often limited in scope and/or 
lacks mechanisms for implementation. 
 
Certain criteria received a high score in several hospitals, reflecting important steps towards independence from corporate 
influence. These included adaptations to recent laws in France, for example on gifts and benefits, speaking activities, pro-
curement and medical services, and creation of an authority for monitoring COI. Other major criteria appear not to have 
been considered, even in the hospitals with the most comprehensive COI policies. These included participation in promo-
tional events, accredited continuing education, ghostwriting, public disclosure of financial interests, and clinical trial pub-
lication and research transparency.  
 
Media coverage of a similar survey on COI policies in French medical schools carried out in 2017 [30] had a major im-
pact on subsequent policy, leading the medical faculties deans' conference to draft a charter to address conflicts of inter-
ests [34]. It may have encouraged some hospitals to begin to reflect and develop actions in this field as well. The top rank-
ing hospital, Toulouse, developed its policy after the publication of the survey of medical faculties, in cooperation with 
the medical faculty. On the other hand, APHP hospitals (Paris) had begun to discuss implementation of COI policies prior 
to the study publication. The larger distribution of grades, which range from 0 to 24 out of 58 points, when compared with 
the medical faculties study, tends to indicate that the awareness of conflicts of interests is still heavily dependent on the 
local context and actors, and that a national reflection is warranted. 
 
We also found that in a few cases, teaching hospitals had begun to consider development of COI policies, but had not yet 
implemented them, an encouraging step in terms of future policy development.  Among others, Toulouse hospital has a 
regularly updated work plan and set up an ethics committee. APHP has set up a commission devoted to the prevention of 
conflicts of interest, whose report served as a basis for the first amendments to the internal regulations, and the creation of 
a foundation for research.  Montpellier has developed a charter containing ten commitments to prevent conflicts of inter-
est, particularly in terms of transparency, relations with companies, governance, transparency in research and the ap-
pointment of an ethics officer. However, this charter had not yet been implemented when we completed our survey.  
These are promising developments, reflecting a real dynamic for change, not yet fully represented in these study results.  
 
Transparency of research funding and of clinical trial results, in particular requirements for publication (criteria 11,12,13) 
are important elements of policy development, as teaching hospitals have an important role in research and these policies  
aim to mitigate publication bias. However, the registration and publication of clinical trials is not addressed by any teach-
ing hospital. Eight French teaching hospitals were amongst the 20 sponsors internationally with the largest rate of unre-
ported trials registered on clinicaltrials.gov, according to the Alltrials initiative [38].  
 
Several hospitals have set up foundations to centralize external funding of their research. However, a score of 3, reflecting 
a high policy standard, required the publication of amounts received from companies, and that the foundation replaces and 
eliminates prior funding circuits, namely ad hoc charities created and managed by the hospital departments, known as 
‘associations de service’. These are prone to opacity and conflicts of interests and the French General Accounting Office 
has recommended their elimination [1]. Even the APHP and Toulouse hospitals, who had the most comprehensive COI 
policies among our sample, have not effectively tackled this issue yet. Strong opposition from some key opinion leaders 
and the Contract Research Organizations and Biotech sectors had already led the government to water down these regula-
tions and allow hospitals to maintain the ‘associations de service’ [39, 40].  
 
Education on conflicts of interest, which is now being developed in some medical schools, is still absent from hospitals: 
none reached a score above zero. There is place for significant, rapid and easy improvement in this area. 
 
Finally, the best COI prevention policy cannot be sustainable without explicit processes in place for monitoring and sanc-
tions; only two teaching hospitals have so far set up committees with the responsibility to monitor compliance and issue 
sanctions, APHP and Toulouse. 
 
We have little evidence of international comparisons, since only the American Medical Students Association (AMSA) has 
carried out a similar study in 200 teaching hospitals in the United States in 2014. Unfortunately, the results have not been 
published, but an unpublished report is available on the AMSA archived website [37]. This study, carried out in 2014, 
found, among 204 teaching hospitals, a "perfect score" (grade 3) in 90% of hospitals for enforcement of policies, in 65% 
of cases for medical device representatives, between 40 and 50% of cases for ghostwriting, gifts, consulting, meals, and 
speakers bureaus; poor scores are obtained for medical sales representatives, disclosure of COI, COI education. Even if it 
is difficult to compare two very different educational and hospital systems, it appears that the work carried out over the 
years by AMSA on this subject has made it possible to achieve progress in the existence and use of COI policies, which 
encourages the same work in France. 
Furthermore, the dynamics triggered by studies on medical schools seems to have a similar impact on teaching hospitals 
in the United States and in France. 
 
 
 
This is the first study of its kind in France, and Europe, which will certainly require further methodological corrections, 
even if our methodology is largely based on a list of significant clinical [ 21, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45] or institutional [ 19, 29, 
35, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50] references. The rating given in the appendix (our definition of ratings) is a proposal for interpreta-
tion, to be adapted according to the realities of the hospital.  
 
Some of these criteria, built de novo, may need to be corrected in future studies. For example, we have noted that several 
of the hospitals internal rules include a reminder of the civil service code provisions prohibiting all healthcare personnel 
from receiving any benefit or rewards, or from engaging in paid work outside the hospital. This regulation allows deroga-
tions only for doctors, allowing them to carry out activities on behalf of healthcare companies (consulting, expertise, 
teaching). When the hospital regulation does not specify any waiver, we had to consider that any advantage or ancillary 
activity is indeed prohibited and grant a rating of 2 or 3 for criteria 1 and 7. However, experience and data from the public 
transparency database prove that this policy is not enforced [18]. These criteria definitions shall warrant revision in future 
studies. 
 
Due to the low response rate to our three requests, our findings rely mostly on charters and internal rules and regulations 
published online. This may introduce a discrepancy between hospitals based on the availability or not of the correspond-
ing documents online. But we considered that websites are an important source of information for hospital staff and pa-
tients, and that documents concerning COI management should be publicly available there. 
However, it is important to note that the hospitals internal rules and regulations are a mandatory, public document by law 
(Code de la santé publique L6143-1). Their absence from the hospital website or the refusal to grant access to it upon a 
freedom of information access request is an indication of poor policy in itself. 
We noted that hospitals with a developed policy had communicated publicly about their initiative in the media. It is there-
fore unlikely that a hospital with a substantial policy went unnoticed in this study. 
It is hoped that the next survey, if necessary, will enable hospitals to correct data they consider insufficient. The lessons 
learnt from AMSA faculties studies clearly demonstrate the dynamics one can expect from such a ranking. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is the first survey in France to examine COI policies at teaching hospitals. Despite the laws and regulations, the pub-
lic interest and media coverage, too few hospitals have taken steps to develop a real policy that protects patients and care-
givers. However, some effort was made locally, to draft or implement such a policy, even if the result is incomplete at the 
moment. There is no national policy driven by the public authorities; examples of implementation are mainly the result of 
individual initiatives by Chief Executives, which have been highlighted in the media. Health services can and must be 
proactive in reducing corporate influence[51], but it is essential that each public hospital structure implement a strong 
conflict of interest management policy, models of which are now publicly available, some of which incorporate most of 
the criteria we have used [52]. 
We note that similar studies in the USA and France, concerning medical schools, have encouraged advances in the field. 
The score of American faculties is constantly increasing from year to year, under the influence of repeated studies carried 
out by AMSA, who developed a scorecard [53]. Medical learned societies have taken a stand on the subject of COI [54]. 
The conference of French medical schools deans took a strong position on the subject after the French study on faculties 
[34]. These observations can reinforce the need for such studies at regular intervals. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 : Overview of COI policy scores for each French teaching hospital (n = 17)*. 
 
Hospital Total score 
(range 0-58) 
Score of 1 : policy exists, may not be 
active 
Score of 2 : limited scope Score of 3 : high standard  
Toulouse 24 [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[2] promotional presentations or speeches 
[4] medical conferences funded by 
companies  
[8] [9] access of representatives 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in hospital 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[13] hospital service associations 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical devices 
[16] COI education for teaching hospital staff 
[18] governance rules 
[19] monitoring the application of rules and sanctions 
[14] frameworks of market surveys 
[20] authorities responsible for monitoring  
APHP3 20 [2] promotional presentations 
[7] speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in hospital 
[19] monitoring the application of rules and 
sanctions 
[1] management of gifts and benefits 
[13] hospital service associations 
[[15] procurement of medicines or medical devices 
[18] governance rules 
 
[11], research funding 
[20] authorities responsible for monitoring 
APHM4 12 [19] monitoring the application of rules and 
sanctions] 
[1] management of gifts and benefits  
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in hospital  
[18] governance rules 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical devices 
 
Montpellier 11  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives  
[14] frameworks of market surveys 
 
Poitiers 9 [8] [9] access of representatives 
 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical devices  
[3] promotional events funded by companies 
Angers 8  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
[8] [9] access of representatives 
 
Nantes 6 [1] management of gifts and benefits [1,11] [7] advisory or speaking activities 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical devices 
 
Reims 6 [2] promotional presentations or speeches 
[15] procurement of medicines or medical 
devices 
[1] management of gifts and benefits 
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
 
Lille 4 [7] advisory or speaking activities  [1] management of gifts and benefits 
Nîmes 4  [1] management of gifts and benefits  
[7] advisory or speaking activities 
 
Nice 3 [16] COI education for teaching hospital staff 
[17] extension of rules to all actors in hospital  
[20] authorities responsible for monitoring  
  
Orléans 3 [7] advisory or speaking activities [1] management of gifts and benefits  
Rouen 2  [1] management of gifts and benefits  
Besançon 1 [1] management of gifts and benefits   
Brest 1 [11] research funding   
Dijon 1 [1] management of gifts and benefits   
Bordeaux 1 [7] advisory or speaking activities   
* An additional 15 French teaching hospital  had no information on conflict of interest policies on their websites, and 
failed to reply to our request for information (See Appendix Table 2 for the list of all French teaching hospitals). 
  
                                                             
3 Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris 
4 Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Marseille 
 
Appendix table 1 : Guide for the scoring of the 20 criteria 
 
All criteria (except Nr10) are rated from 0 to 3: 
Note 0: the hospital has no COI prevention policy for this criterion, or it is not accessible. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy of prevention of COI, communicated to staff, but this policy does not provide 
any additional information in relation to regulatory and legal obligations for this criterion. 
Note 2: the hospital explicit policy for COI meets limited requirements, or their monitoring is insufficient. 
Note 3: the hospital explicit policy for COIs meets a high level of requirements. 
 
Criterion 1: Management of gifts and benefits 
Note 3: Any benefit financed by a company, regardless of its nature or value, including catering during staff or convivial 
moments, is prohibited.  
Note 2: Business financing of the following benefits is prohibited: 
"benefits directly related to training (manuals, brochures, materials, flyers,),  
The term "catering" is used to refer to the provision of catering, which is provided during a continuing education course 
funded by the company or provided on site through direct or indirect financing by the company. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy of preventing CIs, communicated to staff, which requires only the publication 
of any advantage financed by a company. 
 
Criterion 2: Presentations or Promotional Speeches 
Note 3: Promotional presentations or speeches are forbidden within the hospital premises.  
Note 2: Promotional presentations or speeches are tolerated only at non-validating, non-mandatory and unpaid 
meetings. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of CoI, communicated to staff, which authorizes 
presentations and promotional speeches, only outside healthcare departments. 
 
Criterion 3: Participation in promotional events funded by companies. 
Note 3: Participation in events funded entirely by corporate sponsor sis prohibited. 
Note 2: Participation in an event funded by a corporate sponsor, provided that the participant is neither financially 
supported nor remunerated, is tolerated. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit CoI prevention policy in this context, communicated to staff, which does not limit 
participation in an event funded by a company. 
 
Criterion 4: Attendance at medical conferences or internships funded by companies. 
Note 3: Participation in conferences or trainings funded by health care companies is prohibited for all hospital 
professionals, including staff in training. 
Note 2: Participation in a conference or training funded by a company is permitted, provided that the participant is 
neither financially supported nor remunerated. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of CoIs in this context, communicated to staff, but this does 
not limit participation in a conference or training funded by a company. 
 
Criterion 5: Accredited Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
Note 3: Hospital staff are not allowed to participate in CME activities funded, directly or indirectly, by healthcare 
companies. 
Note 2: Hospital staff are authorized to participate in CME funded, directly or indirectly, by health care companies, 
provided the participants bear a part of the cost of the program. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs in this case, communicated to staff, but this does 
not limit participation in corporate sponsored CME activities  
 
Criterion 6: Ghostwriting 
Note 3: The involvement of all authors, including medical writer, is presented in the publications signed by hospital staff. 
The writing of articles or publications as a "ghost " author (ghostwriting), or the signature as an honorary author, is 
prohibited. 
Note 2: The involvement of all authors, including medical writer, is presented in the publications signed by hospital staff. 
 Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy of preventing COIs in this context, communicated to staff, but this does not 
limit participation in publications. 
 
Criterion 7: advisory or speaking activities on behalf of companies 
Note 3: Consultancy for commercial or marketing purposes are prohibited. Activities for scientific purposes are subject to 
authorization by the hospital. 
Note 2: All ancillary activities are subject to authorization by the hospital. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs in this context, communicated to staff, but this does 
not limit the activities of consultants and speakers. 
 
Criterion 8: Access by representatives of pharmaceutical companies 
Note 3: Sales representatives do not have access to medical departments within the hospital. 
Note 2: Sales representatives can access medical departments, provided they have a formal agreement with the hospital, 
which prohibits contacts outside referents designated by the hospital structure. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs in this context, communicated to staff, which allows 
presentations by representatives of pharmaceutical companies only under the form of collective meetings. 
 
Criterion 9: Access of representatives of medical equipment, biology and imaging companies 
Note 3: Sales representatives of medical, biological or imaging equipment companies may access hospital services only 
for non-commercial reasons, such as technical assistance or equipment training. 
Note 2: The presence of sales representatives of medical device companies is allowed for commercial reasons, but they 
may only be in contact with the referents designated by the hospital structure. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, which allows presentations 
by representatives of medical devices companies only under the form of collective meetings. 
 
Criterion 10: Public disclosure of speaker’s interests 
Note 0: No conflict of interest prevention policy. 
Note 1: The hospital explicit policy of prevention of CIs requires all speakers (external or personal) within the hospital to 
disclose their interests. 
  
 
Criterion 11: Research Funding 
Note 3: The hospital has set up a compulsory centralized collection system (e. g. a hospital foundation) for private 
funding of medical research. 
Note 2: The list of sponsors participating in the financing of medical research involving the hospital teams, and the 
amount of funding, are public. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COI in this context, communicated to staff, but this does 
not require the publication of private funding for medical research involving the hospital staff. 
 
Criterion 12: Publication of clinical trials, transparency of research 
Note 3: In addition to the criteria in Note 2, the hospital policy includes an open data policy for clinical trials sponsored 
by the hospital and encourages the opening of data from trials in which it participates. 
Note 2: The hospital policy and contracts with a third-party sponsor require that all trials in which the hospital 
participates be registered and a summary of the results posted on at least one primary registry approved by WHO. Any 
confidentiality clause in industrial sponsorship contracts must explicitly exclude from its scope information obligations 
owed to participating patients and pharmacovigilance obligations. 
Note 1: It is the hospital policy that all trials sponsored by the sponsoring hospital should be registered prior to entry of 
the first patient, and an abstract of the results published within 12 months of the end of the trial, on at least one primary 
registry approved by WHO.  
 
 
Criterion 13: Hospital service associations 
Note 3: Associations operating in hospitals, whether or not headquartered within the premises, are not allowed to raise 
funds from healthcare companies. The authorization to operate care, research or teaching activities is subject to the 
domiciliation of accounts with the public accountant. The hospital has set up a centralized (e. g. a Foundation) and 
transparent channel for the collection of private funding, whatever its destination. 
Note 2: The hospital policy states that associations operating in hospitals must first be registered on a public list and 
authorized. Associations having the hospital as registered address should have their accounts managed by the public 
accountant. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy of preventing COIs in this context, communicated to staff, but this policy does 
not provide any additional information in relation to regulatory and legal obligations for this criterion. 
 
Criterion 14: Framework for market surveys 
Note 3: The hospital CoI prevention policy specifically prohibits staff participation in market surveys conducted by 
healthcare companies. 
Note 2: The hospital CoI prevention policy specifically prohibits staff participation in market surveys where remunerated. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy of preventing COIs in this context, communicated to staff, but this does not 
limit participation in market surveys. 
 
Criterion 15: Procurement of medicines and medical devices 
Note 3: Participation in purchasing and evaluation decisions for medical products, devices or equipment is prohibited for 
personnel having a link of interest with a stakeholder. Note 2: Any hospital personnel involved in purchasing and 
evaluating medical products, devices or equipment must submit a public declaration of interest. 
 Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs in this context, communicated to staff, but it does 
not require a public disclosure of interests from staff involved in purchasing and evaluating medicines. 
 
Criterion 16: Conflict of interest education for teaching hospital staff 
Note 3: Issues related to conflicts of interests in medical research, clinical practice and the training of health 
professionals are regularly included in the continuing education of the hospital staff. 
Note 2: A training session on the issues related to conflicts of interest in medical research, clinical practice and the 
training of health professionals is organized for the hospital staff. 
 Note 1: The hospital has an explicit awareness policy on the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, but it does not 
include training on conflicts of interest. 
 
Criterion 17: Extension of the rules to to all actors linked to the teaching hospital 
Note 3: The COI prevention policy applies to all the hospital personnel, regardless of their status, and in all places where 
they perform their professional tasks, even if the local establishment does not have the same requirements. 
Note 2: The COI prevention policy applies in only one of the two situations above. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, but this does not specify 
that it applies to staff in all settings.  
 
Criterion 18: Governance rules 
Note 3: All personnel involved in the hospital governance is barred from participating in decisions where he/she has a 
competing interest. Note 2: All personnel involved in the hospital governance must submit a regularly updated public 
disclosure of interests. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, but this policy does not 
require public disclosure of interest or restrictions in participation. 
 
Criterion 19: Monitoring the application of rules and sanctions 
Note 3: The policy implementation is monitored and non-compliance subject to effective sanctions. An annual review is 
carried out and made public. 
Note 2: At least one of the above actions is carried out. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, but this does not include 
any monitoring of its enforcement. 
 
Criterion 20: authorities responsible for monitoring and reporting on conflicts of interest 
Note 3: The hospital has appointed a deontologist or an ethics committee to monitor, inform and advise on the 
prevention of COIs. 
Note 2: The hospital has appointed a deontologist, or deontology commission, to provide information and advice on the 
prevention of COIs. 
Note 1: The hospital has an explicit policy for the prevention of COIs, communicated to staff, but it does not designate a 
dedicated deontologist or ethics committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teaching Hospital  Website address 
Amiens http://www.chu-amiens.fr/  
Angers http://www.chu-angers.fr/  
AP-HM Marseille http://www.ap-hm.fr/  
AP-HP Paris http://www.aphp.fr/  
Besançon http://www.chu-besancon.fr/  
Bordeaux  http://www.chu-bordeaux.fr/ 
Brest http://www.chu-brest.fr/ 
Caen http://www.chu-caen.fr/ 
Clermont-ferrand http://www.chu-amiens.fr/ 
Dijon http://www.chu-dijon.fr/ 
Grenoble http://www.chu-grenoble.fr/ 
Guadeloupe http://www.chu-guadeloupe.fr/  
La réunion http://www.chu-reunion.fr/  
Lille http://www.chu-lille.fr/ 
Limoges http://www.chu-limoges.fr/ 
Lyon http://www.chu-lyon.fr/  
Martinique http://www.chu-fortdefrance.fr/  
Metz-Thionville http://www.chr-metz-thionville.fr/  
Montpellier http://www.chu-montpellier.fr/ 
Nancy http://www.chru-nancy.fr/  
Nantes http://www.chu-nantes.fr/ 
Nice http://www.chu-nice.fr/ 
Nîmes http://www.chu-nimes.fr/ 
Orléans http://www.chr-orleans.fr/ 
Poitiers http://www.chu-poitiers.fr/ 
Reims http://www.chu-reims.fr/ 
Rennes http://www.chu-rennes.fr/ 
Rouen http://www.chu-rouen.fr/ 
St Etienne http://www.chu-st-etienne.fr/  
Strasbourg http://www.chu-strasbourg.fr/ 
Toulouse http://www.chu-toulouse.fr/ 
Tours http://www.chu-tours.fr/ 
 
 
 
